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UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT TRANSACTIONS AND WHO SHOULD
BEAR THE LOSSES
FRANCIS J. FACCIOLO*
INTRODUCTION
This article is concerned with how losses should be allocated between
account holders that are implicated in payment systems and the financial
institutions that participate in those payment systems by acting as interme-
diaries between account holders. It does not consider how losses should be
allocated among the various financial institutions. (It is, of course, possible
that a financial institution may be the account holder.) Although such an
approach is often seen as one focusing on the concerns of individual con-
sumers, the account holders that are discussed in this article are not limited
to individual consumers. At times, of course, the nature of the account
holder is relevant and, at those points, this article will distinguish between
the types of account holders. When a distinction is important, this article
will refer to individual and small business account holders as "small ac-
count holders."
This article examines how an unauthorized transaction can be pre-
vented and what this suggests about who should bear the loss of such a
transaction. In doing so, this article looks at two moments at which an un-
authorized payment transaction might be prevented: before the first unau-
thorized transaction, and after the first unauthorized transaction. An
authorized transaction, of course, can be converted, while it is being exe-
cuted, to an unauthorized one. The classic example is the check that is sto-
len after it is completed by the account holder by some third party who
alters the payee or amount payable. But this article will focus only on the
period before the first unauthorized transaction is executed and the period
after it is executed.
* Francis J. Facciolo is on the faculty of the St. John's University School of Law. A version of
this article was delivered at the symposium on Rethinking Payments Law, April 27, 2007, sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. I wish to thank Dean Mary C. Daly for a summer research
grant to support my work on this article. In addition, I wish to thank William H. Manz, Senior Research
Librarian, and the staff of the St. John's University School of Law library for their invaluable research
help.
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As many commentators have pointed out, the rules involving payment
systems show a wide range of divergent approaches. In the period before a
transaction is executed, some payment systems take the possible negligence
of an account holder into account in allocating losses for unauthorized
payment transactions. The checking system is the classic case.l In contrast,
the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) and the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
(EFTA) both ignore the negligence of an account holder prior to the unau-
thorized transaction. 2
Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code, dealing with wire trans-
fers, adopts a third approach. It includes a strict liability standard for the
account holder if the receiving bank has created a commercially reasonable
security procedure pursuant to which the transaction is executed.
Professor Gillette focused on the discrepancy between Articles 3 and 4
on the one hand, and the TILA and the EFTA on the other, and concluded
that, based on this discrepancy, "[t]he law of payments, therefore, contains
a puzzle. Why should regulations that govern functionally equivalent pay-
ment devices--checks and cards-vary in both form and substance? ' 3 He
analyzed three possible explanations: a public choice explanation, a histori-
cal explanation, and a third explanation that "identifies discrete differences
in the characteristics of checks and cards, and examines whether those
characteristics justify the differences in the form and substance of legal
regulation."'4 Professor Gillette's conclusion was that "[e]ach of the prof-
fered explanations-public choice, inertia, and selection of an optimal de-
gree of precision-fails to provide a complete understanding of how the
current system evolved."'5
This article asks a question that is implied in Professor Gillette's ear-
lier article but that is not directly addressed or answered. Given the dis-
crepancy between the negligence concepts embedded in the checking
system, the rejection of these concepts in the TILA and the EFTA (at least
1. Professor Rogers has distinguished between two types of unauthorized payment transaction:
unavoidable and avoidable losses. James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation for
Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 453, 454-55 (2004). His discussion also includes the
situation of a forged indorsement on a check, id. at 457-58, which is not discussed in this article. Pro-
fessor Rogers would disagree with the statement in the main text, at least as it applies to unavoidable
losses. See id. at 467 ("Thus, the rules on forged indorsements and the rules on forged drawers' signa-
tures together embody a very basic but important principle: The burden of unpreventable losses should
rest with the providers of the payment system rather than with the users of the payment system.").
2. Robert D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments,
66 TEX. L. REv. 63, 64-65 (1987).
3. Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L. REV.
181, 184 (1996).
4. Id. at 187-88.
5. Id. at 230.
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in the pre-unauthorized payment transaction context), and the strict liability
approach of Article 4A, should we be considering the adoption of one of
these approaches for all payment systems?
Subsequent to the unauthorized transaction, most payment systems
(other than credit cards) rely upon the account holder reporting the unau-
thorized transaction to the financial institution at which the account is held.
If the account holder acts promptly, the loss from the first and subsequent
unauthorized transactions falls, either by operation of law or contract, upon
the other system participants. Who bears the final loss as between these
participants is also governed by a web of statutory and contract provisions.
If the account holder delays, various levels of loss, depending upon the
amount of delay, the type of loss, and the particular payment system, are
allocated to the account holder. Finally, all payment systems in which small
account holders normally participate (other than credit cards) have some
version of a statement rule that either limits or cuts off any recovery of
unauthorized losses after some extended period of time. And even the
credit card system is beginning to acquire a version of the statement rule
through case law.
As prior commentators on unauthorized payment transactions have
thought about allocation of losses for unauthorized transactions, they have
always come back to the concept that any loss-allocation rule should pro-
vide incentives to the party best able to prevent the unauthorized payment
transaction at the lowest cost. "Where multiple parties (i.e., either custom-
ers or financial institutions) could take such precautions [against loss],
regulations should, therefore, place the obligation on the party who can
avoid the loss at the lowest cost."'6
Professors Cooter and Rubin answer, based on the application of the
three economic principles of loss spreading, loss reduction, and loss impo-
sition, that "[w]hen an invalid instrument is paid ... the principles favor
strict liability for the financial institution if it alone can reduce the loss. But
if both parties can take precaution, and thus reduce the loss, the principles
suggest strict and divided liability, with a relatively low limit on the con-
sumer portion."' 7 By "strict," Professors Cooter and Rubin meant that there
should be no place for negligence principles in allocating losses. In their
view, "the great majority of payment losses" should be strictly allocated
between both consumers and financial institutions, not solely to financial
institutions-an approach that they labeled "complex." 8
6. Id. at 184.
7. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 2, at 124.
8. Id. at 85.
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Professor Mann, writing almost two decades after Professors Cooter
and Rubin and almost one decade after Professor Gillette, has suggested
that who bears the risk of unauthorized transactions "often should be re-
solved based on the nature of the underlying technology." 9 In Professor
Mann's view, losses are in fact imposed "almost complete[ly]" on system
operators because of "an implicit premise that losses in technology-driven
systems are most effectively reduced by technological and system-design
initiatives that are exclusively within the control of the system operator."' 10
He still saw a need to motivate the account holder to take precautions:
The premise of those rules [allocating losses to system operators] is that
even a complete allocation of loss to the network operator will leave the
consumer a sufficient incentive to attend to contract provisions that re-
solve the legal questions summarized above. That could be true because
of the hassle of reversing unauthorized charges, because of doubts that
financial institutions readily will fulfill their obligations in such a situa-
tion, or even because of ignorance of the legal protections for unauthor-
ized transactions.' 1
While Professor Mann's overall summary is true as to unauthorized
transactions that could not be prevented by an account holder's due dili-
gence in examining statements (with the notable exceptions of checks,
presumably not one of the modern payment systems he is discussing, and
Article 4A wire transfers), it is not true of unauthorized transactions that
could be prevented by an account holder's paying attention to her account
and its associated statements.
In addition, the different rules underlying checks and credit cards have
allowed the courts to engage in some creative lawyering. Negligence has
begun to migrate from the bank statement rule in Article 4 of the U.C.C. to
the TILA, particularly in the Second Circuit.
This article examines five of the most common payment systems-
checks, debit cards, ACH debits, wire transfers, and credit cards-and their
general rules for allocating losses prior to and after execution of a payment
transaction. The final section of this article considers recent developments
in society and technology, notably the problems of Internet security and
identity theft. This article asks whether the divergent approaches taken to
the problem of unauthorized payment transactions should be unified. This
article concludes by advocating, at least for small account holders, an ap-
proach based upon principles developed from the credit card system, even
9. Ronald J. Mann, Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633,
638 (2005).
10. Id.at638-39.
11. Id. at 638.
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though these principles were not implicit in the minds of the drafters of the
TILA.
The first step in the analysis is to briefly consider what the loss-
allocation rules are for each of the five payment systems for pre- and post-
transaction activities. This discussion is not meant to be exhaustive, but
rather to highlight the differences in approach between the different pay-
ment systems.
I. CHECKING ACCOUNTS
A. Allocation of Losses Arising from Pre-transaction Activities
The basic rule is that an "item" such as a check must be "authorized"
by the account holder; if it is not "authorized," the check is not "properly
payable." In turn, if the check is not "properly payable," it cannot be
"charge[d] against the account of a customer." 12 As the official comments
to the U.C.C. note, a check "containing a forged drawer's signature or
forged indorsement is not properly payable.' 13
This basic rule is modified in two contexts where an account holder's
own actions can play a role. The first context is where the account holder's
"failure to exercise ordinary care substantially contributes to an alteration
of an instrument or to the making of a forged signature on an instrument."
In that event, the account holder cannot use the forgery or the alteration as
a defense "against a person who, in good faith, pays the instrument or takes
it for value or collection."' 14 Section 3-406(a) of the U.C.C. does not apply,
however, to forged indorsements. In addition, the party, normally the ac-
count holder's bank, asserting the negligence of the account holder has the
evidentiary burden of proving this negligence. 15
The second context is the special rule for responsible employees,
which is a strict liability rule rather than a negligence rule. Under section 3-
405 of the U.C.C., the "fraudulent indorsement" of either the employer or
the payee is "effective" if it is made by "an employee with responsibility
with respect to the instrument," thus putting the loss on the employer. 16
12. U.C.C. § 4-401(a) (2005).
13. Id. § 4-401 cmt. 1. Professor Rogers has written a thoughtful discussion of the forged facsim-
ile signature cases. See Rogers, supra note 1, at 484-509. He discusses the standard agreement between
customers and banks that places the burden on customers for any unauthorized signature if the signature
is a facsimile and whether such agreements should be allowed to vary the provisions of Article 4.
14. U.C.C. § 3-406(a).
15. Id. § 3-406(c).
16. id. § 3-405(b).
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The policy behind this rule is that "the employer is in a far better position
to avoid the loss by care in choosing employees, in supervising them, and
in adopting other measures to prevent forged indorsements on instruments
payable to the employer or fraud in the issuance of instruments in the name
of the employer."' 7 It is, of course, possible for section 3-406 to apply if a
signature is involved or the indorsement is carried out by an employee
without "responsibility" with respect to instruments.
In both contexts, the negligence of the account holder's bank can ab-
solve, on contributory negligence principles, the account holder of some of
the loss.18 As a practical matter, such negligence would be very difficult (if
not impossible) for an account holder to prove. 19
B. Allocation ofLosses Arising from Post-transaction Activities
Checking accounts are subject to section 4-406 of the U.C.C. and its
requirement that "the customer must exercise reasonable promptness in
examining the statement or the items" for any "alteration" or unauthorized
signature.20 Failure to examine the checking account subjects the customer
to liability under subsections (d)(1) and (d)(2). In addition, failure by the
customer to report an unauthorized check "within one year after the state-
ment or items are made available to the customer" precludes the customer
from reversing the unauthorized transaction. 21
"Reasonable" in subsection (b) assumes an economically rational ac-
tor who understands that she should be examining her statements. It does
not assume the actual human beings who use checking accounts, and who
often do not notice discrepancies. The stories of customer neglect are, an-
ecdotally, overwhelming in number. One posting on a blog about Internet
security reported that the author, in going through his deceased mother's
banking account, found a recurring charge for $75 that had been withdrawn
from the account each month by a pornography website. This withdrawal
17. Id. § 3-405 cmt 1.
18. Id. §§ 3-405(b), 4-406(e).
19. The customer not only has the burden of proof, but must also show that the bank "fails to
exercise ordinary care," id. § 3-405(b), or "failed to exercise ordinary care," id. § 4-406(e). "Ordinary
care" is defined in section 3-103(a)(9), which applies to Article 4 via section 4-104(c), as the "obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards, prevailing in the area in which the person [e.g., the bank] is
located, with respect to the business in which the person is engaged [e.g., banking]." Id. § 3-103(a)(9).
In other words, the banks themselves get to define what "ordinary care" is. There is little room for a
customer to argue that a bank should do anything. The only fruitful argument is that a bank failed to do
something that most other banks in the area do.
20. Id. § 4-406(c) (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 4-406(f).
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had been going on for five years without either of the author's parents be-
ing aware of it.22
Another way of understanding section 4-406's requirement that a cus-
tomer act with "reasonable promptness" is to look at this requirement as a
means of allocating blame. In fact the whole concept of "reasonable" has
echoes of torts and of comparative negligence, which is also found in the
pre-transaction context as discussed above.
The same type of provision requiring the customer to pay attention to
her statements occurs in many of the more modem payment systems. The
great exception is the credit card system, which is briefly discussed below,
although there is some recent case law (particularly in the Second Circuit)
that qualifies this generalization. But most other modem payment systems
seem to have adopted a modified version of section 406 of the U.C.C. and
its concept that a customer's failure to respond to a statement showing the
unauthorized transaction should leave the loss with the customer.
II. DEBIT CARDS AND THE ELECTRONIC FUND TRANSFER ACT
The rights within section 909 of the EFTA apply, of course, only to
transfers of funds involving accounts "established primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes. '23 In other words, any business account
would be excluded.
A. Allocation of Losses Arising from Pre-transaction Activities
Section 909 of the EFTA first provides a strict upper limit of $50 on
the loss that can be allocated to an account holder for any "unauthorized
electronic fund transfer."'24 The amount of the loss for which an account
holder can be held liable increases to $500 if (a) the account holder fails "to
report any loss or theft of a card.., within two business days after the con-
sumer learns of the loss or theft (or in extenuating circumstances such as
extended travel or hospitalization, within a longer period which is reason-
able in the circumstances)" and (b) "the financial institution establishes
[that the loss] would not have occurred but for the failure of the consumer
to report the loss or theft." 25
22. Posting of Anonymous (June 9, 2006, 17:22 PST) to Schneier on Security,
http://www.schneier.com/blog/ (Apr. 15, 2005, 09:17 PST) [hereinafter Schneier on Security).
23. Electronic Fund Transfer Act § 903(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(2) (2000).
24. Id. § 909(a).
25. Id. § 909(a)(2).
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B. Allocation of Losses Arising from Post-transaction Activities
A debit card holder, whose account is subject to the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act, has to notify her bank "within sixty days of the transmittal of
the statement (or in extenuating circumstances such as extended travel or
hospitalization, within a reasonable time under the circumstances) [of] any
unauthorized fund transfer" or lose her right to "reimbursement" for losses
that would have been prevented by such notice.26
The EFTA's statement rule is less harsh than section 4-406 of the
U.C.C. No reimbursement need be made to the account holder if the condi-
tions of section 4-406 are met. In contrast, any losses over $50 that would
not have been prevented by notice from the account holder (either within
two days of knowledge of the loss or theft of the debit card or within sixty
days of the transmittal of a statement) must be reimbursed by the bank
under section 909(a) of the EFTA.
III. ACH DEBITS
A. Allocation of Losses Arising from Pre-transaction Activities
Although the ACH Rules do include the concept of an unauthorized
credit or debit entry, there is no provision (except for one covering unau-
thorized debits from consumer accounts) that gives a general right to an
account holder to not pay an unauthorized transaction.
Section 8.6 governs an account holder's right to have an unauthorized
debit reversed. As with debit cards and the EFTA, the rights under subsec-
tion 8.6.1, which would apply to most debits, only arise with respect to a
"Consumer Account,"'27 which is defined as "an account.., established by
a natural person primarily for personal, family or household and not for
commercial purposes. ' 28 Once again, any business account would be ex-
cluded.
B. Allocation of Losses Arising from Post-transaction Activities
Unauthorized ACH debit transactions must be reported by the Re-
ceiver (i.e., the account holder) to the Receiving Depository Financial Insti-
26. Id.
27. NAT'L AUTOMATED CLEARING HOUSE ASS'N, 2007 ACH RULES: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO
RULES AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING THE ACH NETWORK, § 8.6.1, at OR 28 (2007) [hereinafter 2007
NACHA RULES].
28. Id. § 14.1.20, at OR 41.
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tution (RDFI) "within 15 calendar days from the date the RDFI sends or
makes available to the Receiver information relating to the debit entry."'29
If such a report is not made, the RDFI is not obligated to "promptly credit
the amount" of the debit entry. In other words, the RDFI is given a safe
harbor from Receiver claims that the transaction was unauthorized. In addi-
tion, the report must be a "written" affidavit in a prescribed format.30
Similar provisions would apply to a POP transaction involving a con-
sumer account. 31 A POP transaction is a one time point-of-sale transaction
involving the conversion of a "source document" (e.g., a check) 32 into an
electronic form. The "source document" must be "provided to the Origina-
tor by the Receiver at the point-of-purchase to effect a transfer of funds
from an account of the Receiver." 33
The closest provision that would apply to businesses is found in sec-
tion 2.5, and even this section would only be useful in the event of an unau-
thorized credit from an Originator's account. Section 2.5 provides that an
"erroneous entry" may be corrected if the "reversing entry" is "transmitted
to the Receiving ACH Operator in such time as to be transmitted or made
available to the RDFI by midnight of the fifth banking day following the
Settlement Date of the erroneous entry." 34 An "erroneous entry" includes
both an entry that "orders payment to or from a Receiver not intended to be
credited or debited by the Originator" and an entry that "orders payment"
in the wrong amount.35 An exercise by the Originator (e.g., an account
holder) of its right under subsection 2.5.2 triggers an obligation of the
Originating Depository Financial Institution (e.g., the account holder's
bank) to provide an indemnity to all financial institutions and the ACH
Operator in the chain of payment orders from the Originator to the Re-
ceiver. 36
29. Id. § 8.6.1, at OR 28.
30. Id. §§ 8.6.1., 8.6.5, at OR 28-29.
31. Id. § 8.6.2, at OR 28.
32. Id. §3.7.2, atOR 17.
33. Id. § 14.1.48, at OR 43.
34. Id. § 2.5.1, at OR 8.
35. Id.
36. Id. § 2.5.2, at OR 8. Contractual arrangements between the ODFI and the Originator could
provide for the Originator to indemnify the ODFI, in turn, for the indemnity required by the ACH rules.
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IV. WIRE TRANSFERS AND ARTICLE 4A
A. Allocation of Losses Arising from Pre-transaction Activities
Insofar as Article 4A applies to a wire transfer, it provides an incen-
tive to the bank that receives a payment order from an Originator (i.e., the
account holder) to create a security procedure to ensure that the payment
order is authorized. If the receiving bank puts in place "a commercially
reasonable method of providing security against unauthorized payment
orders" and "compl[ies] with the security procedure and any written agree-
ment or instruction of the customer restricting acceptance of payment or-
ders issued in the name of the customer," even an unauthorized payment
order will be treated as if it were authorized. 37 If the receiving bank does
not put in place a commercially reasonable security procedure, it would
have the evidentiary burden of proving that an allegedly unauthorized
payment order was in fact authorized, 38 a burden that could be very diffi-
cult to meet.39 As the official comments to section 4A-203 state, "If a
commercially reasonable security procedure is not made available to the
customer, subsection [4A-202](b) does not apply.... [T]he bank acts at its
peril in accepting a payment order that may be unauthorized." 40
It is also possible for an Originator to choose a security system not de-
signed by the receiving bank and for that security system to be "commer-
cially reasonable." For such a procedure to be reasonable, it must be chosen
only "after the bank offered, and the customer refused, a security procedure
that was commercially reasonable for that customer. '4 1 In addition, the
Originator must "agree[] in writing to be bound by any payment order,
whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in
compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer. '42 The
practical effect of such a provision would seem to be to encourage a cus-
tomer to accept a security system designed by the receiving bank in order
to avoid the costs of developing its own system.
The drafters of Article 4A expected receiving banks to develop the se-
curity systems and designed Article 4A to impose on the receiving banks
"[t]he burden of making available commercially reasonable security proce-
37. U.C.C. § 4A-202(b) (2005).
38. Id. § 4A-202(a).
39. Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72
TuL. L. REV. 1177, 1229-30 (1998).
40. U.C.C. § 4A-203 cmt 3.
41. Id. § 4A-202(c) (emphasis added).
42. Id.
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dures... because they ... are in the best position to evaluate the efficacy
of procedures offered to customers to combat fraud."'43 This choice cer-
tainly makes sense if we think of the receiving banks as the experts in the
field of wire transfers and, therefore, the best parties to develop proper
security procedures.
In contrast, "[t]he burden on the customer is to supervise its employ-
ees to ensure compliance with the security procedure and to safeguard con-
fidential security information and access to transmitting facilities so that
the security procedure cannot be breached. '44 This is, of course, the impo-
sition on the account holder of what is, in effect, a strict liability principle.
The account holder can no longer argue, as she could with a checking ac-
count, that she took all the appropriate measures to prevent an unauthorized
transaction. In addition, it is no longer the bank's burden to prove that the
account holder was negligent.
The one argument that the account holder will have left is that the
bank itself was negligent although, as with the checking system, this is a
very difficult (if not impossible) thing for the account holder to prove. 45
B. Allocation of Losses Arising from Post-transaction Activities
The bank statement rule for wire transfers is found in U.C.C. section
4A-505, which creates a "statute of repose" for receiving banks.46 If an
Originator receives "notification reasonably identifying the order," the
Originator has one year "after notification was received" to notify the re-
ceiving bank of "the customer's objection to the payment." If the Origina-
tor fails to do so, then the Originator "is precluded from asserting that the
bank is not entitled to retain the payment. '47
43. Id. § 4A-203 cmt 3.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 4A-203(a)(2). The official comment notes that the "confidential information [necessary
to institute an unauthorized payment order] must be obtained either from a source controlled by the
customer or from a source controlled by the receiving bank." Id. § 4A-203 cmt. 5. The customer has the
burden of "prov[ing] that the person committing the fraud did not obtain the confidential information
from an agent or former agent of the customer or from a source controlled by the customer." Id. The
official comment assumes that there would be criminal and bank internal investigations of any unau-
thorized payment order because of the large sums of money involved and that the customer would have
access to the results. Id. Although the comment does not explicitly say so, presumably the prediction
that such investigations would occur is meant to assuage doubts as to how a customer could ever meet
her burden of proof
46. Id. § 4A-505 cmt.
47. Id. § 4A-505.
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V. CREDIT CARDS
A. Credit Cards and the Truth-in-Lending Act
Credit cards provide almost complete protection to consumers and
many small businesses against unauthorized transactions. Section 133(a)(1)
of the TILA imposes a series of conditions that a card issuer must meet
before it can impose liability upon a cardholder. But in no event can a card-
holder be liable for more than $50 "for the unauthorized use of a credit
card." 48
Although most provisions of the TILA do not apply to "extensions of
credit primarily for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes ... or to
organizations," 49 section 133 does apply to a card issuer and a business or
organization that has nine or fewer employee card holders with that card
issuer's card. In theory, section 133 could apply to any business or organi-
zation, but it provides that a card issuer and a business or organization can
agree to exclude the operation of section 133 if the business or organization
has ten or more employees with that issuer's card.50
The irony of the protection against unauthorized transactions above
$50 that is built into the credit card system for consumers and many small
businesses is that the protections grow out of a conception in the early
1970s that credit card use above a certain dollar limit is really an extension
of credit, rather than a use of the card as a payment system.51
B. The Erosion of the Truth-in-Lending Act
In 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit looked to section
4-406 of the U.C.C. for negligence principles that should, in that court's
view, be applied to credit cards. 52 Although the facts in Minskoff v. Ameri-
can Express Travel Services are particularly extreme, and the Second Cir-
cuit used a circuitous route to arrive at its holding, the result is that a
statement rule, with the associated concept of negligence, is creeping into
the law of unauthorized credit card payment transactions. 53
48. Truth in Lending Act, § 133(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a)(l)(B) (2000).
49. Id. § 104(1).
50. Id. § 135.
51. See Roland E. Brandel & Carl A. Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit, 69
MICH. L. REv. 1033, 1059-64 (1971).
52. Minskoffv. Am. Express Travel Serv., 98 F. 3d 703 (2d Cir. 1996).
53. See DBI Architects, P.C. v. Am. Express Travel-Related Serv. Co., 388 F.3d 886 (D.C. Cir.
2004); Carrier v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 383 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 2005), aff'd, 180 Fed. App'x 296
(2d Cir. 2006).
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Minskoff revolved around the question of whether a series of fraudu-
lent credit card transactions were "authorized" because section 133 of the
TILA provides that "[a] cardholder shall be liable for the unauthorized use
of a credit card only if ... the liability is not in excess of $50."54 The ac-
count involved in Minskoff was a corporate account that was used by one of
the corporate employees to carry out over $300,000 in fraudulent transac-
tions over a three year period.55 During this period, the president and chief
executive of the company did not look at the twenty-eight credit card
statements that showed both the name of the corporate employee and her
charges, nor did he look at any of the cancelled checks that were used to
pay for the charges.56
The Minskoff court looked at the definition of "unauthorized use" in
the TILA57 and noted that it provides that the term "means a use of a credit
card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have actual, im-
plied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the cardholder
receives no benefit."' 58 Looking to common law notions of apparent author-
ity, the Minskoff court held that the card issuer was entitled to rely upon the
apparent authority of the employee; therefore, section 133 did not dictate
that the card holder had no liability beyond the $50 limit. "A cardholder's
failure to examine credit card statements that would reveal fraudulent use
of the card constitutes a negligent omission that creates apparent authority
for charges that would otherwise be considered unauthorized under the
TILA." 59
The Minskoff court relied upon the policy embodied in section 4-406
of the U.C.C., the bank statement rule, that whoever is in the best position
to detect a forgery or alteration should be liable for it. The court, by charac-
terizing this statutory provision as "derived from a common law obliga-
tion" 60 was, by extension, also characterizing the policy as one favored by
the common law.
The opinion did distinguish between the obtaining by the employee of
new cards and the transactions on these cards. "[T]he acquisition of a credit
card through fraud or theft cannot be said to occur under the apparent au-
thority of the cardholder .... ,,61 Sometime between the employee's "initial
54. Truth in Lending Act § 133(a)(1), (a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
55. Minskoff, 98 F.3d at 706-07.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 708.
58. Id. (citing Truth in Lending Act § 103(o)) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 709-10.
60. Id. at 709.
61. Id.
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possession" of the unauthorized credit cards and their "subsequent use,"
negligent acts by the card holder can create apparent authority.
To date, the Minskoff approach has only been applied to credit card
accounts held by businesses. But there is nothing in the reasoning of this
case and the handful of other cases that have considered card holder negli-
gence that would prevent the apparent authority principle from being ap-
plied to fraudulent use of a consumer credit card by a family member,
friend, or acquaintance of the card holder.
VI. How PRIVACY AND IDENTITY THEFT IMPACT THE CURRENT Loss-
ALLOCATION RULES
It is important to place the legal rules that have evolved into their his-
torical context. The rules for checking accounts, embodied in Articles 3 and
4 of the Uniform Commercial Code, evolved in world in which a limited
number of people had checking accounts and in which the transaction had
to be initiated with a piece of paper that had been physically signed. In
addition, if you were an individual, it was unlikely that you had more than
two accounts-a checking and, in some cases, a savings account.62
Today, we live in a world where the numbers of account holders, the
accounts per holder, and the numbers (and types) of transactions involving
cards and electronic transfers have expanded exponentially. 63 For example,
a much larger percentage of United States households now have at least
one credit card as compared to the situation in 1969.64 In addition, the debit
card is a relatively recent innovation.65
62. See Robert D. Bowers, Businesses, Households, and Their Banks, in BANKING MARKETS AND
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Thomas G. Gies & Vincent P. Apilado, eds., 1971). Most small businesses
"in central Bucks County [Pennsylvania] used a single commercial bank for all of their banking needs"
and "the typical bank-business relationship is one of long standing." Id. at 271-72. Nationally in 1967,
only 68% of households in the United States even had a checking account. Id. at 273.
63. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-929, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED
COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE DISCLOSURES TO
CONSUMERS 9, 10 (2006) (discussing credit cards). The best source of credit card data, CardWeb.com,
does not allow legal academics to access its data. The GAO, however, was able to access that data and
reports that the number of credit cards in use has grown from considerably less than 100 million in 1980
to more than 691 million by 2005. Id. at 9, 10 fig. 1. The yearly charge volume has increased approxi-
mately six times from 1980 to 2005, from approximately 300 billion dollars to more than 1.8 trillion
dollars. Id. at 1, 9. In 1970, there were approximately 300 million outstanding credit cards, including
150 million independent retailer cards, 50 million bank credit cards, 6 million travel and entertainment
cards, 1.5 million air travel cards, and 13 million miscellaneous credit cards. H.R. REP. No. 91-1500, at
7(1970).
64. In 1969, approximately 25% of households had a bank credit card. This percentage increased
to 48.3% for households with post-graduate college education. Robert Johnston, Credit and Credit
Cards, in BANKING MARKETS AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 62, at 258. In 2001, 76.2% of
all households had credit cards (72.7% had bank cards); 47% used debit cards; and 69.8% had ATM
cards (which, of course, might overlap with the debit card category). Elizabeth Klee, Families' Use of
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The changing means of making payments has greatly complicated the
issue of security for an account holder. In a paper-based check world, pro-
tecting a single checkbook or savings passbook would provide a reasonable
certainty to the account holder that an unauthorized transaction could not
occur. Similarly, when credit cards first became widely available in the
United States in the 1960s, most transactions were conducted in person,
with the card physically present. 66 As she could in a paper-check world, a
small account holder could achieve reasonable security by ensuring that her
credit card never left her physical possession.67 Indeed, the Federal Reserve
Board official staff commentary on Regulation Z, which implements the
TILA, interprets the requirement that a "card issuer has provided a means
to identify the cardholder on the account or the authorized user of the
card" 68 as implying that the card be physically present when a charge is
made. 69 Today an unauthorized transaction involving a bank account, credit
card, or any other account holding financial assets or providing access to
financial assets requires only access to a limited amount of information
concerning the account and its holder. Not surprisingly, the number of such
incidents and the aggregate amounts involved in such incidents has grown
markedly over the past ten years.
A couple of illustrations from current litigations show the ease with
which access can be obtained to another person's financial accounts. The
first is the case of the United States of America v. Payment Processing
Center, LLC. The alleged scheme was described as:
Payment Instruments During a Decade of Change in the U.S. Payment System 21 tbl.2(a) (Bd. Of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Paper No. 2006-01, 2006), avail-
able at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200601/200601 pap.pdf.
65. David A. Balto, Can the Promise of Debit Cards be Fulfilled?, 53 Bus. LAW 1093, 1093
(1998) ("Another payment system-debit cards-was relatively uncommon in the United States until
the mid-1990s.").
66. Rogers, supra note 1, at 497 ("At one time, no merchant would accept a credit card payment
without obtaining the signature of the user.").
67. Where credit card transaction are conducted in person, "use of the card depends on physical
possession of the card" and "the customer can reduce the risk by taking good care of the card and
promptly reporting its loss. Taking care of articles like cards or keys is largely a matter of common
sense (to be contrasted with the precautions required to protect electronic systems .... )" Nicholas
Bohm, Ian Brown & Brian Gladman, Electronic Commerce: Who Carries the Risk of Fraud?, J. OF
INFO. L. & TECH., Oct. 31, 2000, at 4, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/jilt/2000-3/bohm.
68. Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R § 226.12(b)(2)(iii) (2007).
69. 12 C.F.R. pt. 226, supp. I, § 226.12, para. (b)(2)(iii), notes 1 & 3. The commentary gives as
examples of adequate "means to identify" the following: "signature, photograph, or fingerprint on the
card, or electronic or mechanical confirmation." Id. at note 1. The "card itself (or some other sufficient
means of identification of the cardholder)" must be "presented" in order for the cardholder to be liable
for a transaction. In a sense, the commentary is treating the "means to identify" as an evidentiary basis
for finding that an unauthorized transaction has occurred. A cardholder would not, for example, be
liable for an unauthorized transaction "when merchandise is ordered by telephone by a person.., using
a credit card account number or other number only (which may be widely available)." Id. at note 3.
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[A] complex and sprawling scheme involving the seven individual de-
fendants and a corporate defendant, hundreds of thousands of victims
who are dispersed throughout the country, hundreds of thousands of
fraudulent transactions, dozens of domestic and foreign telemarketers
operating under innumerable fictitious names, and tens of millions of
dollars of consumers' money being transferred to banks in the United
States and abroad.70
The scheme made use of remotely created checks drawn on the accounts of
senior citizens. 71 Senior citizens are particularly fruitful targets, because
illness often prevents them from realizing that a fraud is occurring. In addi-
tion, even when a senior citizen realizes that a fraud is occurring, she may
be afraid to seek help, because her relatives may take control of her finan-
cial life away from her.72
The second is a securities fraud action brought by the Securities and
Exchange Commission, SEC v. Kamardin.73 Although Kamardin did not
involve payment systems, it does highlight the vulnerability to hacking of
computer systems maintained by financial institutions. In this case, one
individual was allegedly able to "surreptiously usurp[] the online trading
accounts of the victim investors at various broker-dealers, liquidate[] the
investors' existing equity positions, and us[e] the resulting proceeds [to]
purchase[] thinly-traded stocks in the investors' accounts in order to create
the appearance of trading activity and to inflate the price of the stocks. '74
70. United States of America's Memorandum in Opposition to the Defendants' Motion to Dis-
solve the Asset Freeze at 4, United States v. Payment Processing Center, LLC, No. 06-00725 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 8, 2006).
71. Charles Duhigg, Bilking the Elderly, with a Corporate Assist, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at 1.
See generally Kurt Summers, Note, Remotely-Created Checks; Legislative Reluctance, Reciprocity
Requirements, and the Federal Rule that Changes Everything, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1179 (2006)
(describing remotely-created checks and the 2005 amendment to Regulation CC defining "remotely
created checks" and creating transfer and presentment warrants for such checks).
72. Duhigg, supra note 71. Duhigg describes the plight of Richard Guthrie, who allegedly lost
more than $100,000. The first step was for a telemarketing firm to create a list of senior citizens. Mr.
Guthrie enjoyed the calls from telemarketing employees. "I really enjoy when those salespeople call.
But when I tell them I can't buy anything now, they hang up. I miss the good chats we used to have."
The telemarketing firm then sold the list to a criminal, who used various pretexts during telephone calls
to senior citizens on the list to gain banking data for the senior citizens. Id.
73. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Kamardin, No. 8:07-cv-159-T-24-MAP, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 44260 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 2007). The scheme was a pump-and-dump scheme whereby
Kamardin used the compromised accounts to purchase shares in "thinly-traded issuer[s]," thereby
driving up the price of the shares. Once the price had been driven up, Kamardin sold shares he had
already purchased at inflated prices. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief at 1, Kamardin, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44260 (No. 8:07-cv-159-T-24-MAP). The defendant transferred his profits, and
evidently fled, to Russia.
74. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Relief, supra note 73, at 1.
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The broker-dealers at which the compromised accounts were located in-
cluded major broker-dealers. 75 The scheme went on for six weeks. 76
To make matters even more complicated, the limited amount of in-
formation necessary to initiate an unauthorized transaction is held not only
by the account holder and the financial institution at which the account is
located, but by numerous third parties such as credit card merchants with
which the account holder has interacted. The account holder can do nothing
to protect this information from being stolen electronically from such insti-
tutions' computers or from being stolen physically. To take just one exam-
ple, a recent article in The Wall Street Journal reported that restaurants are
one of the most fertile grounds for the theft of credit card details. 77 Al-
though the credit card industry has security protocols that all merchants are
supposed to follow, "'There are tens of thousands of restaurants that aren't
complying' with industry security rules."' 78 The result is that, "[s]ince Janu-
ary 2005, restaurants represented about 40% of incidents in which intruders
gained unauthorized access to credit-card information, according to data
tracked by Visa." A firm that "conducts security audits for mer-
chants... says that 62% of the security breaches it has seen over the past
18 months came from the restaurant industry."79
The examples of losses of personal data by (and thefts of personal data
from) third parties are myriad. News articles appear weekly reporting that
the private information of thousands, often more, of account holders has
been jeopardized. One website publishes a chronological list, which is usu-
ally updated twice a week, of data breaches reported in the U.S. from 2005
through 2007. As of April 5, 2007, the list was sixty-one pages in length
and included data breaches involving 150,520,490 records that contained
"data elements useful to identity thieves, such as Social Security numbers,
account numbers, and driver's license numbers." 80 The overall number of
75. "The accounts were intruded into at various broker-dealers, including E*Trade Securities,
Scottrade, Inc., TD Ameritrade, Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Charles Schwab & Co., Inc." Id. at
4.
76. Id. at 2. The automation of a pump-and-dump scheme by use of computers has some parallels
with how a payment systems fraud could be expedited, but is even more striking because a pump-and-
dump scheme usually requires multiple bad actors who act over an extended period of time. "What
historically required legions of con artists and days or even weeks of planning and execution was in this
instance accomplished single-handedly or by a small group within only minutes." SEC Pursues Alleged
Perpetrator of Market Fraud Using Others 'Accounts, 39 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 135-36 (Jan. 29,
2007) (quoting John Reed Stark, Chief of the SEC's Office of Internet Enforcement).
77. Robin Sidel, Card Companies Crack Down on Restaurants: Diners' Personal Data Not Well
Protected, Visa and Others Say, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24-25, 2007, at BI.
78. Id. (quoting Robert Carr, CEO of Heartland Payment Systems Inc.).
79. Id.
80. Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, http://www.privacyrights.org/
ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
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records does not necessarily reflect the number of individuals affected as
"[s]ome individuals may be the victims of more than one breach." But the
compilers of the list believe that "[i]n reality the number given below [for
records involved in data breaches] should be much larger. For many of the
breaches listed, the number of records is unknown."
Some of this stolen or lost information would allow the thief to insti-
tute unauthorized transactions directly; some of this stolen or lost informa-
tion would allow the thief to attempt such a transaction only if she found
additional information about the account holder. This information could be
obtained through deceptive telephone calls or e-mails or even through pub-
licly available information on the Internet.
Most identity theft involves someone that the victim knows. But
criminals are becoming more and more involved. In addition, unauthorized
transactions have moved from the realm of the individual criminal to the
realm of organized crime. There is one gang operating out of Russia, the
Rocky Gang, that has a minimum of twelve members and that took in more
than an estimated $150 million in 2006.81
The structure of the Internet itself helps create the myriad security
problems. The Internet is structured so that the end points of the networks,
the computers (PCs in the case of individuals and most small businesses),
are usually designed to be open to computer programs from any source
rather than from a limited range of controlled sources. 82 Combine this
openness with a resistance to any control over the content on the Internet,
i.e., end-to-end neutrality,83 and with continual access by high speed con-
nection of PCs to the Internet,84 and you create a situation in which the PC
owners lose control of their own computers unless the PC owners possess
unusual technical competences. 85
The most that an account holder can do is to try to make her own
Internet access devices, including her computers, relatively secure and, if
she has received physical records of her accounts, to make sure that these
records are either physically secure and in her possession or physically
destroyed in a manner that makes the information contained within them
unreadable. The first piece of bad news is that she does not in any real
81. Arjen de Landgraaf, The Almost Perfect Bank Heist, FIN. TIMES (U.S.A), Mar. 14, 2007,
Digital Business Special Report, at 3.
82. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1974, 1983-84 (2006).
83. Id. at 1988.
84. Id. at 1995.
85. Id. at 2003--05. To properly secure PCs, the owners would have to know "how to manage or
code their PCs ... [and] to apply patches rigorously [and to] observe good password security." Id. at
2005. Few PC owners have such skills.
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sense control her operating system, browser, or other crucial software and
that there is a high level of expertise necessary to deal with security prob-
lems.
As to the operating system, the most widespread ones are versions of
Microsoft Windows. And, as anyone who has used Windows knows all too
well, there have been numerous security problems involving versions of
Windows. A similar set of security problems has been created by Micro-
soft's Internet browser, Explorer, which is the most widely-used browser.
As of April 9, 2007, one website that specializes in security issues in soft-
ware has approximately 1710 postings, each describing a different security
vulnerability in a Microsoft product. 86 It is unrealistic to expect any indi-
vidual to spend the energy necessary to keep up with these security prob-
lems, much less try to run all the patches necessary to fix them.
Security experts suggest that the typical individual computer user at a
minimum should do the following to make her personal computer more
secure: "Install and regularly update firewall, anti-spyware, anti-virus and
browser security software if you have a home computer." If you are using
public computers, "ensure that they are equipped with appropriate security
software."' 87 How many of the readers of this article carry out all these
steps? And how many of you even know what "appropriate security soft-
ware" would be on a public computer, much less be able to find it if you
did know? On an anecdotal level, I certainly do not carry out all of these
steps and I have no idea what security software a public computer should
contain.
It is not surprising that some writers about online security issues rec-
ognize that it is unrealistic to expect most individual computer users to take
adequate technical measures to protect against identity theft. The victims of
online fraud "should install firewalls and have adequate virus protection-
but they often do not. And an inability to use technology safely and poor
appreciation of the risks involved, [sic] makes consumers doubly vulner-
able." 88
In the United Kingdom, a committee of the House of Lords, in a re-
cent report, 89 stated that "[t]he current emphasis of Government and policy-
86. SecurityFocus, Home Page, http://www.securityfocus.com/bid (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
87. JAVELIN STRATEGY & RESEARCH, 2007 IDENTITY FRAUD SURVEY REPORT-CONSUMER
VERSION: How CONSUMERS CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES 5 (2007), available at http://www.javelin
strategy.com/research/all (scroll down to "February 2007").
88. Peter Cochrane, Banking Fraud-We Need the Will to Stop It, FIN. TIMES (U.S.A), Mar. 14,
2007, Digital Business Special Report, at 2.
89. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE, HOUSE OF LORDS, PERSONAL INTERNET SECURITY,
2006-7, H.L. 165-I, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/Idsctech/
165/165i.pdf.
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makers upon end-user responsibility for security bears little relation either
to the capabilities of many individuals or to the changing nature of the
technology and the risk."90 Based on these realities, the committee recom-
mended that internet service providers should be liable "once ISPs have
detected or been notified of the fact that machines on their network are
sending out spam or infected code" 91 and that consideration be given to
making software and hardware manufacturers liable for damage arising out
of security problems. 92 Although the remedies proposed by the committee
are beyond the scope of an article about payment systems, they should
remind us of how serious these issues are and prompt consideration of who
is the proper party to control technological risk.
If the account holder uses only a computer with a fixed telephone line
at predictable hours, this gives the financial institution three pieces of in-
formation to use to verify the account holder. Even if the account holder
were to use a work computer, this is only one additional access device,
although the account holder would not control this computer. Combine
these three pieces of information with a user name and password (or PIN)
and you have a five-factor security system that is difficult to penetrate. But
we have moved to a world of two-factor identification (user name and pass-
word), driven by the technological changes that allow account holders to
access their accounts in many different ways, the social changes that favor
constant and universal connection to the Internet, and the competition be-
tween financial institutions to accommodate their account holders.
The issues with how access to accounts is changing will just become
more and more serious, especially as new means of accessing accounts are
created. As one journalist described the current situation:
People increasingly access bank accounts on the hoof, gaining access
over the internet by local area networks, Wi-Fi, or 2.5/3G mobile con-
nections from multiple locations and multiple terminals. PCs, laptops,
PDAs and other mobile devices equipped with browsers access bank ac-
counts from anywhere, including the home, office, intemet cafe, airport
lounge, hotel bedroom and public kiosks.93
The journalist could have added that the accounts with financial assets that
are accessed in this fashion are not limited to bank accounts.
The possible access devices just keep multiplying. Citibank, for ex-
ample, has introduced a new product, Citi Mobile, that allows access to a
bank account through a cell phone. The product is available "on a wide
90. Id. at 80.
91. Id. at 81.
92. Id. at 82.
93. Cochrane, supra note 88.
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range of phones" and Citibank's website reports that "more [are] on the
way." All information will be protected by 128-bit encryption. 94 The ability
of a thief to intercept the information, however, will be greatly increased by
her ability to intercept it in e-mail transmitted through a wired network.
The greatly expanded means of an account holder's communicating
with her financial institutions creates not only increased opportunities for
technical interception of account information, but also increased opportuni-
ties for thieves to physically observe account holders using passwords and
user names.
Losses of personal information can trigger three types of identity theft:
"unauthorized use or attempted use of existing credit cards," "unauthorized
use or attempted use of other existing accounts such as checking accounts,"
and "misuse of personal information to obtain new accounts of loans, or to
commit other crimes. '95 The first two categories, of course, implicate one
of the key concerns of payment systems: the allocation of losses for unau-
thorized transactions. In contrast, the third category is not one that the law
of payment systems has historically addressed. The law of payment sys-
tems deals with unauthorized transactions involving existing accounts and
the allocation of the losses arising from these transactions. But it has no
special competence on what the legal consequences of a new account,
opened with stolen information, should be.
The 2004 National Crime Victimization Survey, a national survey of a
representative sampling of households conducted by the Bureau of Justice
Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice, reported that 1,736,700 house-
holds had experienced unauthorized use of existing credit cards and
896,500 households had experienced unauthorized use of other existing
accounts. 96 These households constituted 2.3% of all U.S. households.
Households with a household income of $75,000 or more and households
headed by a person age 18-24 were most likely to suffer one of the three
types of identity theft.97 The reported losses suffered from the three types
of identity theft were approximately $3.2 billion. "The losses reported in-
clude money that may have been reimbursed by others such as credit card
companies or insurance companies and exclude such things as costs associ-
94. Citibank, Citi Mobile, http://www.citibank.com/us/index.htm (select "Introducing Citi Mo-
bile" under "New and Noteworthy") (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
95. KATRINA BAUM, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IDENTITY THEFT, 2004, at 1 (2006), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/it04.pdf.
96. Id.
97. ld.at2&tbl.l.
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ated with paying higher interest rates and wages lost from time spent clear-
ing up problems associated with the theft."'98
Of great interest to thinking about how to allocate losses caused by
unauthorized transactions is how households discovered the identity theft.
Identity theft involving credit cards was discovered by 43.0% of house-
holds when they were "[c]ontacted about late/unpaid bills" (30.7%), ex-
perienced "[b]anking problems" (11.8%), "[n]otified by police" (0.4%), or
"[d]enied phone or utility service" (0.1%).99 The comparable percentage
for unauthorized use of other existing accounts was 25.7%. The latter
households discovered the theft when they were "[c]ontacted about
late/unpaid bills" (9.0%), experienced "[b]anking problems" (11.7%),
"[n]otified by the police" (0.6%), or "[d]enied phone or utility service"
(4.4%). The comparable overall percentage for multiple types of theft-
which would have had to include at least one of the two types of unauthor-
ized use-during the same incident is 43.3%. In all three categories, there
is a large residual percentage that learned of the theft in some other way,
ranging from 19.3% (existing credit cards) to 35.2% (other existing ac-
counts), with the multiple types of theft falling in between at 27.5%. 100
It is interesting to note that households appear to have been more care-
ful about accounts other than credit cards, as 25.7% of the households be-
came aware of the theft through means that appear most clearly to have not
been initiated by the households (an "external means"), while the compara-
ble percentage for credit cards is 43.0%. Perhaps households have been
motivated by the rules for allocating unauthorized losses to be more atten-
tive to accounts other than credit card accounts.
The percentage of households that came to know of the theft through
an external means is still quite large for either category. Why this should be
so is briefly explored below.
As to the two moments at which losses could be prevented, upon
which this article is focused (i.e., before the unauthorized first transaction,
and subsequent to the first unauthorized transaction), regarding the first
transaction, many computer security experts do not hold out much hope
that account holders, at least small account holders, can or will do much to
prevent unauthorized transactions using information stolen from their com-
puters. These experts think the problem of unauthorized transactions should
be reconceptualized. Instead of focusing on how to prevent access to an
98. Id. at 5.
99. Id. at 3 tbl.2.
100. Id.
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account, they think that the problem is preventing the unauthorized transac-
tion:
The user's PC is possibly the worst place of all to try to secure the bank-
ing system, as the bank has no say whatsoever about what software is in-
stalled, who uses it, what other things are done with the machine and so
on. It's a lost cause. I will say now that there is no way you can prevent
access credentials from being stolen. 101
As one computer security expert put it, "the user's PC... is owned by the
phishers[,] I'm afraid."'102 One well known computer security expert has
gone as far as to suggest that the basic model for allocating responsibility
for unauthorized transactions should be the credit card system. 103 From his
perspective, the important thing about the credit card system is that the
allocation of losses has caused the credit card companies to focus on the
proper thing, which is "verifying the transaction," rather than "verifying the
cardholder or putting requirements on what he does."'104
In part, this focus on policing the transaction and not the account
holder is a technical matter, especially with respect to small account hold-
ers. The operating systems that make such theft all too easy are not created
or controlled in a real sense by small account holders. In addition, even
those technical solutions that exist and that are relatively affordable may be
beyond the technical expertise of the small account holder. Finally, studies
have shown that even relatively straight forward current security systems
will not be used by small account holders.
One recent study examined security measures that financial institu-
tions have taken against man-in-the-middle attacks and phishing. 105 The
study involved three study groups, one of which played the role of an
online banking customer, the second of which played this role but was told
that account security was the subject of the study, and the third of which
used their own accounts. All of the accounts were located at the same bank
and the study gave the participants three clues that there might be security
problems. The clues escalated in seriousness: the first was the presence of
"http" instead of "https" on the bank's password-entry page, the second
was the removal of the site-authentication image, and the third was a blunt
101. Paul McGowan, Gone Phishing ... (May 5, 2005) (unpublished article, available at
http://members.optusnet.com.au/paul.mcgowan/phishing.html); accord Schneier on Security, supra
note 22.
102. McGowan, supra note 101.
103. Schneier on Security, supra note 22.
104. Id.
105. Stuart E. Schechter et. al, The Emperor's New Security Indicators: An Evaluation of Website
Authentication and the Effect of Role Playing on Usability Studies (Feb. 4, 2007) (unpublished working
draft), available at http://www.usablesecurity.org/emperor/emperor.pdf.
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browser warning page that the participant should be careful. The latter went
so far as to warn that "[s]ecurity certificate problems may indicate an at-
tempt to fool you or intercept any data you send to the server." 106 Neither
of the first two warnings significantly deterred the study participants from
signing into their accounts. The third warning deterred 47% of the role-
playing group that had received no information about the purpose of the
study, 29% of the role-playing group that had received such information,
and 55% of the group accessing their own accounts. 107 As the authors
noted, "[p]articipants who used their own accounts in our study behaved
more securely than those who were assigned to play roles." 108 This finding
supports the common notion that some burden should be placed upon ac-
count holders to monitor unauthorized transactions. On the other hand, the
percentage of account holders willing to ignore even the most blatant secu-
rity warning-36%---is quite startling.
In part, the problem of what small account holders can do before an
unauthorized transaction is a matter of behavioral economics. The results of
the studies on security systems should not be surprising. Individuals use,
for example, an availability heuristic, which relies upon how easy it is to
bring to mind occurrences, and have a "self serving" bias of overconfi-
dence. 109 This article is not meant to be an in-depth exploration of the rele-
vant behavioral economic issues. Rather, it merely means to suggest that
biases of these kinds may contribute to the likelihood that small account
holders will not take all of the protective measures that they should.
Finally, individual account holders have span of control problems.
How can they keep track of their myriad of accounts? As a simple, anecdo-
tal example, think about passwords that are used to access financial web-
sites and the associated accounts online and other websites. I try not to
have multiple passwords. I can barely remember a couple of variations
much less the dozens that I would need to have unique passwords for each
of my financial websites and the other websites on which I am registered.
In fact, as I have had to generate different user names or passwords for one
reason or another, I have had to create a written list that I keep near my PC.
Anecdotally, mine is a common problem and a common solution that raises
obvious security issues.1 10 The problem is just becoming more convoluted
106. Id. at 5-6 & fig. 1.
107. Id. at9tbl.5.
108. Id. at 10.
109. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1165, 1170-73 (2003).
110. The Gripe Line, http://www.gripe2ed.com/ (May 4, 2007, 12:11 PDT).
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as financial institutions add security questions (e.g., "your mother's maiden
name") to websites.
In case anyone thinks that the multiplication of questions is increasing
security, she should consider what computer security experts say. They
point out "there are three ways to authenticate someone: by something he
knows [e.g., passwords], by something he has [e.g., a physical card], and
by something he is [e.g., biometrics like fingerprints]."'1"I An authentica-
tion procedure that uses multiple items from the same category, e.g., a
password and a mother's maiden name, is only marginally more secure
than a procedure that uses one item. It is the use of items from more than
one category that makes for strong authentication. And it is exactly this use
of items from multiple categories that is missing in the online world.
The expectation that small account holders will systematically exam-
ine their myriad account statements for unauthorized transactions is simi-
larly unrealistic. Small, recurrent transactions easily evade small account
holder scrutiny. One reporter for The New York Times, who writes a regular
column entitled "Online Shopper," reported on her expenses with a recur-
ring charge of $10 that had been appearing on her credit card statement for
sixteen months."l 2 As she reports her own behavior, she avoids a careful
scrutiny of her credit statements because "[t]ypically, my statements list so
many troubling purchases." 113 By chance, she saw the $10 charge on a
statement and then started researching it. Luckily, she was dealing with a
reputable merchant, which refunded her all sixteen months' worth of
charges. 114 What would have occurred, however, if she had been dealing
with a fraudster? She could have lost her rights to a reversal of the charges
under the Minskoff line of cases. 115
The same span of control phenomenon occurs, of course, with outright
fraud. One common fraud involving credit or debit cards is for a merchant
(or someone working for a merchant) to take two scans of a card. 116 The
second scan is used to produce a new card. This type of card fraud is called
"card skimming." 117 So long as the withdrawals using the debit card are
111. Bruce Schneier, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD 186 (2003).
112. Michelle Slatalla, Who Charged This? You, That's Who, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at G8.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
116. Council of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., Who's Swiping Your Credit Card?,
http://www.bbb.org/Alerts/article.asp?ID=316 (last visited Mar. 6, 2008).
117. Id.
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small, they may well escape the scrutiny of a small account holder or, if the
small account holder is a small business, of the responsible employee.18
CONCLUSION
This article is not meant to be an in-depth analysis either of the Inter-
net's workings or of the problems of computer security. I do not have either
the necessary expertise or space. Rather, this article is meant to suggest that
the issue of who can police unauthorized payment transactions has become
entangled with a series of technical issues about which many lawyers, my-
self included, have little knowledge. What we should be seeking is a set of
principles for payments law that are not dependent on the current state of
technology. One thing that we should all be able to agree upon is that the
technology has exceeded the ability of most people to understand or control
it, that this fact is unlikely to change, and that the complexity of technology
will just keep increasing. This suggests that we should look to the financial
institutions that participate in the payment systems to police them, includ-
ing preventing unauthorized transactions.
A second thing that we should all be able to agree upon is that the
sheer quantity of information concerning payments that an account holder
must process has grown tremendously. This also suggests that account
holders might be too easily overwhelmed to be effective monitors of unau-
thorized transactions.
It is time for a serious reconsideration of how losses for unauthorized
transactions are allocated and whether there should be a unified approach,
at least with respect to small account holders. The survival of negligence
concepts in the checking system and in the various forms of the statement
rule have left courts with room to allocate the losses from unauthorized
payment transactions on an ad hoc basis.
The Article 4A model would place the burden upon financial institu-
tions to create security systems, but would place the burden upon the ac-
count holders to police the use of these security systems. This allocation of
responsibility may not make sense with respect to small account holders.
118. Interview with Michael Shorr, Chairman, Pendant Partners, Inc. (November 5, 2007). The
withdrawals from the Pendant corporate account went on for five months, were occasional (no more
than two times per month), and were never larger than $10. The employee who reconciled the bank
statements did not want to trouble the Chairman by querying the Chairman about occasional withdraw-
als. She assumed that these were legitimate business expenses. The fraud did not come to light until a
series of withdrawals of $29.99 and $34.99 were made, which were much larger than the prior with-
drawals. In other words, the fraud did not come to light until the frequency and the amount of each
withdrawal increased greatly. Luckily, the bank at which Pendant's account was located did not insist
upon exercising its rights under section 903(4) of the EFTA and recredited Pendant's account for the
fraudulent withdrawals.
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Moving to the credit card model as the default model for payment sys-
tems would squarely place the burden upon financial institutions to deal
with unauthorized transactions. This approach seems most in accord with
the current technological and social realities.

